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Abstract: This article attempts to answer the question of how an ethnographic
survey transformed into a political question at the heart of the young Soviet
Kirghizia. The debate centered on whether a class could be made out of the
manaps, the tribal chieftains, utterly suspect in Soviet eyes. The article argues
that by clothing the Soviet assault on the Central Asian traditional nomadic
societies in the developmentalist Marxist rhetoric, the authorities justified the
elimination of a social group – manaps – that they held accountable for the
backwardness and unproductiveness of the nomadic economy. Thus, the
“proper” categorization of manaps had deep consequences for the theoretical
and ideological legitimacy of the Soviet project of socialist construction in the
national periphery.
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The last days of 1924 heralded a new nation-building period for the fledgling
Soviet government in Moscow, a year in which a new Soviet constitution was
ratified based on the Treaty of the Creation of the USSR. “Since the foundation of
the Soviet Republics,” it proclaimed, “the states of the world have been divided
into two camps: … the camp of capitalism and the camp of socialism. There, in the
camp of capitalism: national hate and inequality, colonial slavery and chauvin-
ism, national oppression and massacres, brutalities and imperialistic wars. Here,
in the camp of socialism: reciprocal confidence and peace, national liberty and
equality, the pacific co-existence and fraternal collaboration of peoples.”1
It was a grand promise of equality to the former colonial peoples of the
tsarist empire. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat and the rule of the
Soviets, colonial injustices would be redressed: although Marxism-Leninism
was first and foremost an ideological statement of equality and freedom from
oppression, it would soon prove its practical effect in the field. The former
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colonial periphery of the Tsarist administration would serve as a model of
socialist progress and nation-building; freed from colonial exploitation and
oppression, national cultures would blossom under socialism.
By that measure, 1925 proved a bitter disappointment in Soviet Kirghizia,
where ideological pronouncements did little to mask the economic and political
failure of the land and water reforms hailed as the first stage of socialist
construction. Short of building bridges of class solidarity in the fractured post-
war society, the land and water reforms resulted instead in the ethnic consolida-
tion of the settler and nomadic communities. Conflict over arable land – the
most precious resource in the war-ravaged countryside – took many forms and
involved many actors. As one of the OGPU (secret police) reports duly noted:
“Here [in Kirghizia], the antagonism is manifested in nearly everything.”2
Local administrative organs quickly became a main arena of contention
between native officials seeking fairer economic distribution and greater invol-
vement in the decision-making process and the central authorities seeking to
establish control over the distant and unstable periphery. The first group,
headed by the former chairman of the Semirechye cell of the Muslim Bureau
(MusBiuro) of the Communist Party,3 Abdykerim Sydykov (1889–1938), was
critical of the reckless application of an ideological template to the management
of the political and economic development within the region. The second group
of officials, appointed by Moscow to administer the Oblast Committee (hereafter
Obkom), the chief executive body of the then province of the Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic, was equally critical. Accusations were rife that
Sydykov represented the same powerful local interests, which thrived under the
Tsarist administration. The stakes were high for both. The former believed that
an indiscriminate application of the party line – and class warfare in a society
with no classes – would lead to the further displacement of the native nomadic
society already ravaged by the Tsarist colonization and the civil war; the latter
knew that the continuing conflict undermined the socialist construction in the
region and reflected poorly on the promise of equality and development.
The search for a possible solution to this conundrum involved a small
ethnographic expedition led by Pavel Kushner (1889–1968), an influential
Bolshevik scholar with impeccable party credentials and military experience in
Central Asia. Well regarded for his research into “social forms” Kushner was
given a task of studying the social structure of the Kirghiz. The findings of the
expedition would be used to determine the scope, the content, and the pace of
2 Sovershenno Sekretno: Lubianka Stalinu o polozhenii v strane (1922–1923 gg., t.1): 243.
(“Obzor vnutrennego politicheskogo polozheniia RSFSR po okrugam za iiul’ 1922 goda”).
3 MusBiuro was dissolved in 1923.
544 Aminat Chokobaeva
socialist construction in the Kirghiz countryside. Put simply, the task of the
expedition was to measure the level of development of the nomadic Kirghiz. Was
the native structure kinship-based or feudal? If it was the “primitive democracy”
of kinship, then a special case must be established for the Kirghiz and the
socialist construction should proceed more slowly so as to bridge the gulf
between a kinship-based, tribal society and a class-based, proletarian society.
This potential conclusion would fit in well with Sydykov’s calls for a different
developmental path for Soviet Kirghizia, but it could hardly satisfy the central
authorities, which maintained that a great leap from feudalism to socialist
development was not only possible but necessary.
The conclusion that the final draft of the survey (as well as its political
interpreters) reached, represented a compromise of sorts since the administra-
tion took both views, and reconciled them in a delicate (and typically Soviet)
balancing act. The participants were not so even-handedly managed; suffering
of ill health worsened by an organized campaign of criticism Kushner left the
academy and joined the Soviet diplomatic corps. Sydykov and most of his 29 co-
signatories lost their good standing with the party, and, eventually, their lives
during the Great Purges of 1936–1938. The stakes – preservation of the native
economy against the socialist construction – proved too costly for the native
players. As the designated class of exploiters, manaps and their families were
eliminated in a series of deportations and repressions between the second half of
the 1920s and the late 1930s.
This article attempts to answer the question of how an ethnographic survey
transformed into political question at the heart of the young Soviet Kirghizia. The
debate centered on whether a class could be made out of the manaps, the tribal
chieftains, utterly suspect in Soviet eyes.4 The article argues by clothing the Soviet
assault on the Central Asian traditional nomadic societies in the developmentalist
Marxist rhetoric, the authorities justified the elimination of a social group –
manaps – that they held accountable for the backwardness and unproductiveness
of the nomadic economy. Thus, the “proper” categorization of manaps had deep
consequences for the theoretical and ideological legitimacy of the Soviet project of
socialist construction in the national periphery.
The article is divided into three parts. The first part establishes the historical
context for the debate, the second part briefly discusses the biographies of the two
main figures of the debate, and the third part examines the theoretic and prag-
matic implications of the debate for the implementation of the Soviet nationalities
policy in particular and the socialist construction in general in Soviet Kirghizia.
4 Prior 2013: 137–158. For a radically different view of manaps as Kirghiz aristocracy, see
Sneath 2009.
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1 The civilizing mission and its discontents
The Soviet approach to the nationalities question – a sum of economic, legal,
and socio-political relations between nations and ethnic groups in the standard
Soviet definition – sought to address two distinct but overlapping tasks: to build
national forms filled with socialist content on the basis of existing ethno-
linguistic communities; and to enforce the socio-economic development of
these groups consistent with the Marxist scale of development. Soviet leadership
believed that human societies develop in successive stages and that institutio-
nalized nationhood was the most advanced stage of historical development.5 By
building the institutional trappings of the modern nation-state, the Bolsheviks
hoped as well to build modern industrialized economies. To do so was an
enormous task in and of itself, but the immediate issue was that the party
knew very little about the peoples who inhabited this vast land. Indeed, the
rhetoric of class often overshadowed the fact that Russia was an empire, not a
nation-state, where less than a half of the total population identified themselves
as Russian. How to get your message across if you do not speak the language?
How to recruit the support of the native peoples in whose name you claim to
act? How to draw borders in areas with mixed population? All of these questions
weighed heavily on the Bolsheviks’ minds.
To be sure, the Bolsheviks did not come to the task of drawing maps
completely empty-handed. They had a relatively comprehensive definition of
nation formulated in 1913 by the future Commissar of Nationalities, Joseph
Stalin. The set of criteria that aspiring nations had to satisfy included “common
language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a
common culture.”6 With this definition at hand, the Soviet administration mobi-
lized professional geographers, economists, statisticians, and ethnographers,
and drafted a plan of actions. The plan was simple. To identify potential nations,
it was necessary to collect data on the ethnic and linguistic makeup of the
subject population. Once this was done, data had to be collected on the social
and economic organization of potential nations to facilitate their development
along the socialist lines.
While simple in theory, the plan was difficult in execution. First, there were
no Bolshevik ethnographers to speak of, and secondly, civil war, famine, and
economic dislocation made access to national regions a risky gamble at best.
The uneasy alliance of Bolsheviks with the experts of the Commission for the
5 Martin 2001: 5–6.
6 Stalin 1942: 8.
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Study of the Tribal Composition of the Population of Russia (KIPS) founded
shortly before the February Revolution of 19177 provided the Party with the much
needed expertise, but the continuing hostilities of the Civil War halted any
serious efforts at data collection during the civil war. It is all the more remark-
able then that the first list of Turkestan’s nationalities was produced by the
ethnographer Ivan Zarubin in 1918. The data was fragmentary and would change
considerably over the next decade, but it was the first step in the project that
spanned more than two decades and represented a herculean joint effort of
Soviet academics and administrators. By 1920, a group of ethnographers headed
by Zarubin handed in a general, albeit incomplete, ethnographic survey of
Turkestan and the Kazakh Steppe.8 The final list of all Soviet nationalities
“granted the form of state” was finalized in 1939 and counted 57 nationalities.9
In addition to defining something as nebulous as nations in areas where the
primary mode of identification was religious, tribal, occupational, or simply
locality based,10 ethnography had a more mundane, practical application as
well; along with population statistics, geographic maps, and topographic sur-
veys, ethnographic data was instrumental in helping Soviet authorities formu-
late approaches to the socio-economic transformation of the multi-ethnic and
multi-religious population of the former empire.11 There was an unmistakable
tint of civilizing mission to the Bolshevik attempts to categorize, catalogue, and
explain backwardness. But backwardness was to be overcome and the Soviet
administration spared no effort in educating itself about its new subject peoples.
The first broad comprehensive study of Central Asia was the result of
cooperation between various branches of Soviet administration and academy,
and came in the wake of the first round of national delimitation and land and
water reforms. The region was still reeling from violence, but the New Economic
Policy reforms, coupled with a well-coordinated military campaign, produced
the desired effect of bringing the native guerrilla movement to a halt – the
numbers of the so-called basmachi (from Turkic “basmak” – to attack) declined
from 46,000 men at the peak of the movement in July 1922 to only 160 men in
August 1926.12 There was however little reason for wholesale optimism. Secret
police reports suggest that land and water reforms were met with skepticism or
7 Hirsch 2005: 7.
8 Zarubin 1925.
9 Hirsch 1997: 276.
10 On pre-revolutionary identities in Central Asia, see John Schoeberlein-Engel 1994.
11 On the role of ethnography in the Soviet nation-building, see Hirsch 2005. On the use of
statistics in the Soviet population management, see Holquist 2001: 111–144.
12 For a general overview of the Basmachi movement, see Khalid 2007: 54–55. TsA FSB f. 2,
op. 1, d. 794, l. 26, TsA FSB f. 2, op. 4, d. 439, l. 219–257.
Ethnography and the Building of a Kyrgyz Soviet Nation 547
general hostility both among the native and settler population. Designed with a
lofty goal of redressing the historical injustices and restoring – in a more
equitable fashion – lands seized from the native population, the land and
water reforms of 1920s inevitably led to numerous incidents of inter-ethnic
violence.13 While some genuine popular support was won (in what is today
northern Kyrgyzstan, the number of Koshchi – the union of poor and landless –
grew to 23,000 by 1921),14 violence also targeted Soviet officials and predictably
split the local administration along the ethnic lines.
The rhetoric of class and the use of nationality as the criteria and the basis
for administrative and territorial organization combined to produce a particu-
larly toxic enmeshment of interests and practices. Local communities proved
adept at exploiting the vocabulary of both class and nationality in gaining
access to land and other material resources.15 Competition over resources took
many forms: at the regional level, considerations of potential benefit prompted
many communities to request the transfer to a neighboring republic, where
conditions were deemed more favorable; at the local level, elections into village
soviets (councils) became a prime focus of competition for access to resources. 16
Petitions and requests represented the more acceptable form of bargaining
with the Soviet administration, but competition for land often degenerated into
outright violence. Fistfights and murders were a common occurrence. Even more
worrying for the authorities was the ethnic nature of the hostilities. A typical secret
police (OGPU) report dated by May–June 1922 reads that “the national antagonism
between the native population and Russian insurgents (sic) is on the rise … which
at times escalates into active resistance.”17 In one of the more contentious
instances, a violent standoff between the Kirghiz and the Russians in the villages
of Iur’evka and Baitik-Pavlovka in spring 1923 was not resolved until after Stalin’s
personal involvement in 1927.18 To add insult to the injury, local populace
organized itself around local strongmen to advance their agendas. An OGPU report
for July 1922 warned that “slogans of struggle with colonial exploitation
13 For the typology of ethnic conflicts in the Soviet east, see Martin 2001: 56–72.
14 Sherstobitov 1964: 101.
15 Hirsch 2005: 172, Edgar 2004: 51–69, Penati 2014 : 201–213.
16 Edgar 2004: 190–191.
17 Sovershenno Sekretno: Lubianka Stalinu o polozhenii v strane (1922–1923 gg., t.1): 187.
(“Obzor vnutrennego politicheskogo polozheniia RSFSR po okrugam za mai-iiun’ 1922 goda”).
18 Loring 2008: 57–61. A list of Stalin’s visitors for January 1927 reveals that Stalin was visited
by certain Semen Rubak, a “peasant” representative of Iur’evka; Prilozhenie. Svodki priema I.
V. Stalinym. Retrieved from: http://istmat.info/node/2812. The conflict was ultimately settled in
favour of Russian villagers who retained their land.
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[kolonizatorstvo] are used by native bai-kulaks and manaps to incite nationalist
passions and encourage hatred against Russians.” The report of the Kirghiz Oblast
Party Bureau for the period from 1924 to 1925 suggests that three years after the
land reforms little had changed and that the native poor lacked class conscious-
ness and remained amenable to the influence of the wealthy – bais, the Kirghiz
equivalent of Russian kulak – and the influential – manaps – who used kinship
authority to “seize control of the village.”19
How to eliminate this harmful influence was a matter of debate; coercion
and repression were the two readily available and frequently used options, but,
as a means of waging “revolution in minds,” organized violence was of limited
use and provoked more violence in response. Some of the administrative mea-
sures introduced by the authorities in an attempt to curtail the “corrupting
influence” of the “wealthy and socially alien elements” of the Kirghiz aul
included disenfranchisement of hostile groups and tighter control over electoral
process; holding mock or repeated re-elections to ensure the victory of a prop-
erly proletarian candidate; and launching a propaganda campaign against
manaps.20 This only proved effective to a limited extent. The poor continued
to support their manap kin and manaps continued to act as intermediaries
between the administration and the local populace. It had become increasingly
clear that land redistribution and administrative measures did not affect the
popular perception of manaps as leaders and benefactors of their communities.
To better understand who exactly manaps were and how they kept onto
their authority and influence even under the assault of socialist modernization,
the Central Asia Bureau of the Central Committee pledged support for the study
of the Central Asian countryside.21 The expedition commissioned and funded by
the Moscow-based Scientific-Research Association for the Study of National-
Colonial Issues dispatched to Kirghizia in summer the same year.22 The expedi-
tion’s stated goal was to examine the social categories and practices, or, to use
the preferred term of Soviet ethnographers, the network of productive relations
that made Kirghiz – Kirghiz. The second equally important but unspoken task of
the expedition was to find classes and, by extension, the class struggle in the
Kirghiz countryside.
19 Sovershenno Sekretno: Lubianka Stalinu o polozhenii v strane (1922–1923 gg., t.1): 243.
(“Obzor vnutrennego politicheskogo polozheniia RSFSR po okrugam za iiul’ 1922 goda”).
20 Otchet Kir. Oblpartbiuro za period 12.11.1924 – 01.03.1925 gg: TsGA PD KR, f.10, op. 1, d. 16:
l. 109–110: Protocol no. 10 Ispolbiuro Kara-Kirgizskogo obkoma RKP(b), 21 April 1925, TsGA PD
KR, f.10, op.1, d.17: l.37: Vsem okruzhkomam VKP(b): TsGA PD Kr, f.10, op.1, d.71: l.26–27.
21 RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 257: l. 12. (Kushner, “Doklad ob ekonomicheskom polozhenie
Kirgizskoi Avtonomnoi oblasti”, 20.08.1925).
22 Alymov 2006: 95.
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2 Pavel Kushner: A Bolshevik ethnographer
in the field
The expedition was led by Pavel Kushner (born Knyshev), a prominent figure in
Soviet ethnography with a commendable record of service for the party. By the
time of his appointment to the head of the expedition, Kushner had already had
experience working in Central Asia, – as the head of the Political Directorate of
the Turkestani Front, no less, – and taught the new generations of “builders of
communism” at the newly established Sverdlov Communist University.23
Kushner’s biography merged scholarly pursuits with political activism and was
exemplary of the Bolshevik search for knowledge for the betterment of society.
Born in 1889 in Grodno to a family of mixed Russo-Jewish background,
Kushner was placed with a distant relative of modest means after his father’s
death. At the tender age of 16 he joined the party and became active in revolu-
tionary activities. Unable to enter university on the account of his “political
disloyalty” Kushner worked at the Riga-Orel railway until 1915, when he moved
to Moscow. In Moscow, Kushner was admitted into the privately funded
Shaniavskii People’s University, which admitted students of both sexes without
regard to nationality, religion, and political views.24 In 1917 Kushner was a
member of Moscow’s Revolutionary Committee (Revkom) and Executive
Committee (Ispolkom) and participated in the negotiation for the surrender of
the Kremlin. Over the next two years, from 1917 to 1919, Kushner rose to the rank
of a deputy head of Moscow Oblast Commissariat of Labor where co-authored
the first Soviet labor code.25
Kushner’s teaching career began in 1919 with the appointment to lead a
group of Bolshevik field lecturers dispatched to Red Army units across the
country. A capable and competent manager with an eye for detail and good
knowledge of Marxist theory, Kushner was soon transferred to Central Asia,
where the civil war did not show any signs of abating and competent staff
was as badly needed as ever. He soon rose to the rank of the Head of the
Political Directorate of the Turkestani Front, and took part in the military assault
against Bukhara. His promising career in Turkestan was cut short by chronic
tuberculosis and, a year later, he returned to Moscow. In 1921 Kushner joined the
newly established Sverdlov Communist University as a lecturer. With some
23 The Sverdlov Communist University was founded in 1919 with the goal educating young
Bolshevik cadres.
24 On Shaniavskii University, see Thurston 1987: 163–166, and Ruble 2001: 196–202.
25 Alymov 2006: 20.
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exposure to the “backward societies” of Central Asia Kushner developed a
course on “the development of social forms” with the goal of “familiarizing
students with residual pre-capitalist relations in various countries, including the
USSR.”26 The course was heavy on theory and introduced students to “the
schematic map of development of social relations in human societies from
prehistoric age to the era of industrial capital” by organizing it into an “orderly,
comprehensive theory, illustrated by historical examples of development of
social forms, such as economy, marriage and family, state, class struggle and
certain ideologies (mainly, religion).”27
This curriculum informed the methodology of the expedition to “one of the
least researched and most backward corners of the Soviet Union.”28 The expedi-
tion consisted of Kushner, two student assistants, Faizi and Saliev, who also
acted as interpreters, and a sketch artist. The small size of the expedition may
seem surprising given the task, but smaller ethnographic expeditions – often
limited to three or four researchers – were not untypical at the time. Financial
constraints, as Kushner himself notes, were among the major issues for the first
Soviet ethnographers.
The expedition travelled over 1,000 kilometers from Aulie-Ata in Kazakhstan
through the Talas valley, Susamyr, and Jalal-Abad, to Andijan in Uzbekistan.29
The material was collected through surveys, interviews, and participant obser-
vation of the population of the villages. The conditions for the expedition were
not ideal; firstly, because of the basmachi gangs, the expedition could only
travel to the relatively safe northern parts of the country; secondly, a great deal
of confusion surrounded the expedition as it moved from village to village. On
one occasion, the expedition was mistaken for a travelling group of sheep
traders, in many other instances, the members of the expedition were suspected
of collecting data for the tax authorities.30 In a sense, Kushner’s interlocutors
were correct to assume that the results of the expedition could and would be
used against them in future. On a loftier, rhetorical plane, however, the expedi-
tion was interested in learning more about manaps – the presumably hostile
social group of well-to-do Kirghiz who wielded disproportional power over the
native countryside, and that sought to undermine the socialist construction from
within by infiltrating the administration of the young Soviet republic.
26 Kushner 1927: 206.
27 Kushner 1927: 206.
28 Kushner 1927: 41.
29 Kushner 1927: 41.
30 Kushner 1927: 43.
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3 Abdykerim Sydykov: A manap in Soviet service
Indeed, the majority of the native cadres of Soviet Kirghizia came from the
privileged manap background. The man whose will and political skills drove
the creation of Soviet Kirghizia in 1924, Abdykerim Sydykov, was not an excep-
tion. His great grand-uncle was Baityk Kanaev (1820–1886), the manap of the
Solto tribe who aided the Russian conquest of northern Kyrgyzstan, then tribu-
tary to the Kokand. Sydykov’s grandfather, Ozbek Boshkoev (1826–1912) was the
country regent at the colonial administration and passed this position onto his
son, Sydyk Ozbekov.31 Sydyk Ozbekov’s son, Abdykerim, was born in 1889, the
same year as Kushner, in the village of Bashkara-Su in the Semirechye province
of Russian Turkestan. As a boy he attended a local religious school, and in 1904
enrolled in the prestigious Verny gymnasium. After graduating in 1911 he was
admitted into the Kazan University but had to quit his studies because of illness.
In 1913 he began working as an interpreter at the Pishpek county administration,
where he was soon promoted to the rank of deputy county commissioner.32
During the February revolution, Sydykov at first joined the provisional
administration as the deputy commissar of Pishpek district, but soon resigned
when the Provisional Government refused the claims of Kirghiz and Kazakh
refugees whose land was seized by settlers during the revolt of 1916.33 In
summer 1917, Sydykov, along with several other representatives of native intel-
ligentsia, founded the Pishpek cell of the Alash-Orda party. Alash-Orda was the
first Kazakh political party and the name of the short-lived autonomy organized
around the party.34 The fall of the Provisional Government prompted him to join
the Socialist Revolutionary Party [the SRs]. There was of course a healthy dose of
political calculation to Sydykov’s decision to join the SRs – the party that won
the elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly; he saw political activism as
an opportunity to become a part of the revolutionary movement in Central Asia,
and by so doing, to have a say over its course in Kirghizia.35
Sydykov was a relatively latecomer to the Bolshevik cause. He joined the
party in 1918 after the SRs split into two factions and the Left SRs joined the
Bolshevik coalition government. Sydykov was not a perfect fit with the party –
his political views erred on the liberal side and his “socially alien” background
would always be viewed with suspicion – but he was one of the very few
31 Loring 2008: 33.
32 Ploskikh 2006: 4–5.
33 Kurmanov 2002: 14.
34 For a survey of Alash Orda, see Olcott 1995: 100–157.
35 Loring 2008: 36.
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educated native workers with administrative experience. His rise to power,
though marred by frequent accusations of bourgeois nationalism, was rapid.
In 1919 Sydykov was appointed the deputy chairman of the Muslim Bureau of
the Semirechye branch of the Communist Party of Turkestan, itself an offshoot of
the Communist Party. In 1922 he was the only Kirghiz delegate to the first All-
Union Congress of Soviets. Like Kushner, Sydykov was also an accomplished
scholar and, through his work, combined political activism with scholarly
research. His writings, many of which remained unpublished for decades,
sought to provide the party with an analysis of social practices and their cultural
content and shape the party’s policies toward the region.36
Unlike Kushner, Sydykov was a statesman first, and a scholar second. He
saw himself too as an advocate of the rights of his people. In this, his views were
closer to those of national communists like the Tatar Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev who
was openly critical of the party’s inconsistent decolonization policies and
Russian communists’ derogatory treatment of non-European national minori-
ties.37 The party too was often critical of Sydykov, who, it appears, was still
indispensable to the regional administration – a fact made obvious by the
number of times he was expelled and then reinstated in the party. By 1925,
however, his role in the notorious “affair of the thirty” – a scandal caused by the
letter criticizing the course and implementation of the party’s policies in
Kirghizia had pushed the limits of the party’s patience. Moscow had had enough
and the ground was set for collision.
4 A campaign against backwardness and
ethnography
The two worlds – of manaps and Soviet administrators – collided in 1925. In June
1925, a group of thirty officials from Soviet Kirghizia,38 led by the then head of
the Semirechye Executive Committee, Abdykerim Sydykov, sent a letter to the
Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party demanding Moscow’s inter-
vention in what they saw as the unfair treatment of the native cadres by the
36 His published works include: “The brief outline of the history of the Kirghiz nation”
published in 1926; “The kinship division among the Kirghiz” published the same year; “On
zhut and fodder shortage in Central Asia” published in 1928; and “The cattle grazing organiza-
tion in nomadic groups” published in 1930. Kurmanov 1997: 103–104.
37 Baker 2014, on national communism in the Soviet East, see Bennigsen/Wimbush 1979.
38 Until December 1936, Kirghiz Autonomous Oblast was a part of the RSFSR.
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Oblast Committee (or simply, Obkom), the chief executive body, and its role in
fomenting factionalism among the native officials:
The Party apparatus was built on the principles of kinship and personal connections of a
given official with the top brass of the Obkom, which encouraged group infighting within
the party and tribal infighting in the masses, and revealed the tendency (of the republican
Obkom) to ignore native officials39 familiar with conditions on the ground and who could
therefore be useful to the party and the authorities in implementing the correct line of
work, particularly, in relation to land reforms.40
The signatories had also accused the oblast leadership of incompetence and “the
petty patronizing and interference […] in […] the practical implementation of
party directives.”41 All of these, warned the thirty, “undermined the authority of
the Soviet and Party apparatus in the eyes of the common working masses.”42
The proper implementation of socialist construction in the Kirghiz countryside
required sensitivity and tact, and, above all, “the first-hand familiarity with […]
and experience in the political pre-emption of clan factionalism.”43 The letter
concluded with an impassioned plea to replace the Obkom leadership and put
an end to infighting in the oblast administration, failing which, the signatories
threatened to resign from their positions.
In response, the Obkom leadership informed the Central Committee that the
letter of the thirty was “an attempt to return to the previous factionalism, with
lies and unfounded accusations” by “socially alien” elites, or manaps. Manaps,
the statement continued, were the real driving force of group conflicts and the
cause of the failure of socialist construction in the countryside. Given the
“seriousness, gravity, and variety of the accusations leveled against the
Obkom,” the Central Committee launched an investigation into the conflict.44
Although the Commission dispatched from the center was in the agreement with
the Obkom leadership on the harmful influence of manaps, the results of the
investigation subjected both sides of the conflict to harsh criticism. The solution
of the Central Committee was a half-hearted, if crude, compromise; although the
39 Until August 1950 the First Secretaries of the Oblast Committee were of non-titular back-
ground. The first ethnic Kirghiz First Secretary of the Oblast Committee, Iskhak Razzakov, was
appointed in August 1950.
40 Kurmanov 1992: 64–67.
41 Kurmanov 1992: 64–67.
42 Kurmanov 1992: 64–67.
43 The demands and complaints of the thirty signatories of the statement were later repeated
almost to word in the 1929 letter of Iusup Abdrakhmanov, then the deputy chairman of the
Council of Ministers, to Joseph Stalin. See Abdrakhmanov 1991: 190–216.
44 Abdrakhmanov 1991: 125.
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chairman of the Obkom, Mikhail Kamenskii, was summarily dismissed from his
position, Sydykov, himself a hereditary manap, and one of his co-signatories,
Ishenaly Arabaev, a member of the Turkestan People’s Commissariat, were
expelled from the party, while the remaining twenty eight co-signatories were
sacked, demoted, or banished to internal exile outside of Kirghizia.45
Meanwhile, Kushner’s expedition came to an end, and in late summer 1925 he
presented his findings at the Central Asia Bureau of the Central Committee. He
declared to an astonished audience that he “found no classes” in Kirghizia. To
summarize, Kushner found a degree of social differentiation in the Kirghiz country-
side where 25% of the population was hired hands with no property of their own,
30% owned some property, but were generally poor, 40% were middle peasants
and 5% – bais and manaps.46 The difference however was of degrees, not classes;
“while some were wealthier, others were poorer, there were no sharp class clea-
vages.”47 Kirghiz identified with their kin, not with class: “If the Kolposh tribe is at
feuds with the Kushchi or Saiak tribe, then the poor and the wealthy of the entire
tribe act together… Everyone is subject to kinship customs and cannot fight them.”48
As an aspiring Marxist, Kushner sought for the roots of the enduring kinship
organization in the backward subsistence economy of the Kirghiz. Manaps,
those “dangerous vestiges” of the past, built their authority on the unfair
conditions of land lease and exchange of agricultural produce for services
under the guise of kinship assistance. This made the kinship structures resistant
to outside practices but vulnerable to alternative economic forms. The policy
recommendations made by Kushner were in the spirit of the NEP and proposed
the gradual introduction of the cash-based market economy to divert the extra-
produce and resources that the manaps accumulated in their hands away from
the hired labor. In parallel to the creation of the new markets, a line of cheap
credits had to be open to help the poor and middle peasants. Put simply, if
manaps were given an opportunity to buy and sell in cash, not exchange in
kind, they would cease to be manaps, because they would no longer have the
livestock that they could lease to their poorer kin. A source of alternative state
micro-financing would also help to break the dependency of the rural poor on
their manaps.49 At the time Kushner’s recommendations received a generally
45 The signatories were aware of potential consequences of their protest and prepared them-
selves for arrest, Kurmanov 2002: 113.
46 RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 278, l. 60. (Kushner, “Doklad ob ekonomicheskom polozhenie
Kirgizskoi Avtonomnoi oblasti”, 20.08.1925).
47 RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 278, l. 60.
48 RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 278, l. 59–60.
49 RGASPI, f. 62, op. 2, d. 278, l. 59–60.
Ethnography and the Building of a Kyrgyz Soviet Nation 555
positive response from the Central Asia Bureau, but very soon this would
change.
The first attack on Kushner’s report came from an unexpected source. In
1926 a special commission convened at the behest of the Central Committee set
out for Kirghizia to investigate “the theoretical confusion in determining the
nature of relics of the pre-capitalist social relations among the Kirghiz.”50 The
issue at stake was whether the Kirghiz exhibited the essential marker of the
Marxist class society – classes – or whether they still continued to identify with
kinship groups. The arrival of the group, headed by the then chairman of the
Central Control Commission of the Communist Party, Aleksei Mitrofanov, sig-
naled the involvement of the highest levels of party leadership in the debate.
Before long, what started as a field study of the distant and underdeveloped
countryside turned into a crusade against backwardness and a campaign against
ethnography.
The results of the commission’s enquiry were discussed at the second plenary
session of the Kirghiz Obkom and were later published in “Bolshevik” – the
official party mouthpiece published every second week. That the debate was
intensely political was clear to all of its participants. To quote a noted Soviet
ethnographer of the nomadic peoples and the author of the theory of “feudal
nomadism”, Sergei Tolstov:
The problem is by no means of academic significance […] its solution allows us to sharpen
our weapon of a correct Marxist understanding […] and applies to the immediate practice
of political struggle, the practice of class war both in the Soviet East and abroad, in the
colonial Orient. The correctness of the practical work of the socialist reconstruction of the
nomadic and semi-nomadic aul of the Soviet East depends on the correct theoretical
solution of this problem.51
The tone was set by the article’s title, which informed its audience “About one
theoretical confusion and its harmful consequences.” First, Mitrofanov leveled
an accusatory finger at Sydykov, the leader of the “chauvinist bai-manap intel-
ligentsia,” who, as a manap himself, refused to see the real class content of
kinship forms, and sought to preserve the traditional authority of manaps
through kinship-based Soviets.52 Then, Mitrofanov lashed out at Kushner:
We do not know what definition of classes Professor Kushner uses, but it is clear that he
thinks that only those who receive their salaries in monetary form can be considered
exploited […] Then, according to Professor Kushner, the worst expression of the “relics of
50 Mitrofanov 1926.
51 Gellner 1988: 99.
52 Mitrofanov 1926: 76.
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the kinship organization” in Kirghizia is manaps. These manaps, as Kushner himself
demonstrates, have their own serfs […] and servants […] in fact, manaps own all the
land in the area of their influence; manaps administer and adjudicate […] Form is not
important, but its content and its essence are [important]. Indubitably, social relations in
Kirghizia have certain kinship features, but these forms were already being filled with a
distinctly feudal content already during the Kokandese rule.53
The thrust of Mitrofanov’s argument was clear: manaps were no longer tribal
leaders, but feudal lords. As for Kushner’s recommendations, not only were they
erroneous, they were actively harmful because, as another party functionary
summed it up, “Professor Kushner’s “theories” do not only contradict the
Leninist thesis that it is possible to skip the capitalist stage of development,
but also nurture the ideology of national bourgeoisie.”54
This was, of course, the real source of the disagreement. Everyone agreed that
the Kirghiz were backward, but just how backward was a point of contention.
Were the Kirghiz a society of kin or of serfs? There was no good way to answer the
question without casting doubt on the Soviet administration’s ability to deliver on
its promise of progress and modernization. To argue that kinship ties in the
Kirghiz countryside were stronger than class divisions would imply that the gulf
of backwardness separating the Kirghiz from socialism was too great to make the
passage to socialism possible in the near future. In this context, Kushner’s
proposal to introduce capitalism into the Kirghiz countryside via market made a
bad impression on the Commission, which viewed it as an attempt to force
“capitalist maturation” on the Kirghiz. A further element of complication arose
from Sydykov’s proposal to “pre-empt” kinship struggle by establishing kinship
councils. If the economic and social relations among the Kirghiz were organized
along the kinship lines, as argued, then kinship councils, not Communist party
cells were the true conduits of nation and state-building in the region.
Yet, to argue – despite the available evidence – that the Kirghiz were
socially stratified, and thus, modern, could lead to far-reaching conclusions
that no one was prepared for. If local communities had indeed classes, then,
by the logic of Marxist model of development, they had reached a point when a
revolution was impending. What was the use then for the Russian proletariat’s
helping hand when the sufficiently class-conscious natives were prepared to
stage a properly Marxist revolution of their own? The answer that no one dared
to spell was revealing: none. What becomes obvious through reading the trail of
documents and articles is that Sydykov, and especially Kushner had inadver-
tently stepped into a debate that ran deeper than a casual observation would
53 Mitrofanov 1926: 76.
54 Tabolov 1928: 74.
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have suggested; their conclusions about the nature of social organization of a
nomadic people of the distant periphery cast a critical eye on the entire premise
of the Soviet state to lift the native peoples from backwardness, which smacked
suspiciously of the earlier colonial civilizing missions.
To reconcile the two views and avert a potentially disastrous outcome
required an act of balancing and streamlining. In a fine example of such
compromise, the commission came to the conclusion that the Kirghiz were
neither tribal nor feudal, but both at the same time. Rather unsurprisingly,
Kushner offered a similar conclusion in his 1929 monograph on “Mountainous
Kirghizia.” Kushner made substantial corrections to the original draft. Most
notably, Kushner and his assistants “concluded that the kinship organization
no longer exists […] in Kirghizia. Although kinship customs still remain strong,
as do the kinship relations, they lack the very basis of the kinship organization –
kinship councils, councils of village elders, and “the primitive democracy.” All
of these have been replaced by a similarly ancient pattern of social organization
whose key feature is the phenomenon of manaps.”55
For Sydykov and the twenty-nine other native officials the debate had the
most serious implications. By the mid-1920s manaps came to symbolize every-
thing that was bad about the young Soviet republic of Kirghizia – corruption and
factionalism, greed and exploitation, and most of all, backwardness.Manaps were
the embodiment, metaphor, and the medium of backwardness – backwardness,
that transposed onto the Marxist scale of development, served as the measure of
success of socialist construction. Manaps, thus, real or mythical, defined the pace
and direction of the Soviet policies in the Kirghiz countryside. As the NEP drew to
closure and collectivization became a distinct reality, war was declared on back-
wardness and its proxies. Traditional kinship-based societies were seen as hot-
beds of militant backwardness, “an obstacle to socialist construction and a tool of
the class enemy.”56 Overnight, thousands of native farmers and herders became a
vestige of the past. The forced deportation of manaps began in November 1928
and continued throughout the collectivization. The formula for measuring wealth
and identifying manaps involved, ironically, the appropriation of the native value
system to establish the monetary equivalent of the nomads’ chief material wealth –
herds. To be considered a manap by the Soviet authorities one simply had to own
more than 400 head of sheep.57 The attractiveness of the scheme lay in its
simplicity and the presumably solid, quantifiable basis, which provided the
authorities with an easily identifiable target.
55 Kushner 1929: 4.
56 Slezkine 1991: 482.
57 TsGA KR, f. 21, op. 16, d. 98.
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The collectivization drive was soon followed by the party purges of 1932–33,
which marked the beginning of a concerted effort by the government to rid the
apparatus of all the wreckers and “former people” like Sydykov, who infiltrated
the local administration. Manaps were no longer seen as simply vestiges of the
past, but as active wreckers and saboteurs in the service of foreign powers.
Purges targeted groups across the social and political strata and, in the period
from 1934 to 1937, decimated the ranks of native party members by 67.7%.58 By
1939, when collectivization, which had claimed the lives of millions of nomads
in Central Asia and destroyed the local economy. It was then declared a success
that had led to the creation of the truly socialist society. Manaps were singled
out during the campaign as the cause of all the crises that befell the native
population, as well as the major obstruction of the socialist construction. They
ceased to exist, both as a social group, and as a bogeyman of Soviet adminis-
tration in Kirghizia.
5 Epilogue
It is likely that Kushner and Sydykov never met in person, which makes their
involvement in the political life of early Soviet Kirghizia all the more poignant.
Despite the differences in the social background the two men betrayed similar
views on the content and the pace of socialist modernization of the Kirghiz
countryside. That Sydykov’s works, with a few exceptions, were not published
until after the collapse of the Soviet Union, suggests that his position as a
statesman, although more influential and powerful than that of Kushner, also
made him both more dangerous and more vulnerable in the eyes of the party. In
some ways Kushner’s and Sydykov’s hopes of the development and moderniza-
tion of the Kirghiz countryside were realized, although at a much higher price to
the native population than Sydykov envisioned and in a very different way than
proposed by Kushner. Ultimately, both Sydykov’s criticisms and Kushner’s
policy recommendations proved unacceptable for the administration.
The drama that unfolded over the two decades of the violent transition to
socialism claimed millions of lives, including Sydykov’s. Like other victims of
the Great Terror, he was shoehorned into that disgraceful and undeserved role of
the enemy of the people. In contrast, Kushner’s biography is the story of a man
who, true to the Soviet ethos, rose from humble origins and reinvented himself
first as a revolutionary, then, as a scholar, and finally, as a diplomat. It would
also be true to suggest that he avoided the fate of Sydykov by only a dint of luck
58 TsPA RF, f. 62, op. 2, d. 187, l. 19.
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and calculation. It is all the more remarkable then that his return to academia
was made possible by the Great Patriotic War. Kushner’s expertise and ethno-
graphic knowledge were needed to draw an ethnographic map in Eastern Europe
with the view to future border delimitation.
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